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Something Seems Fishy-The Application of the Fourth
Amendment to Coast Guard Searches of Vessels: United
States v. Boynes
On February 1, 1995, two United States Coast Guard officers
patrolling the Red Hook Harbor in the U.S. Virgin Islands noticed a
suspicious substance coming from the overboard bilge discharge
fitting of the ferry boat MONA QUEEN.' The Coast Guard collected
a sample of the substance as it flowed into the vessel's wake.2 Later
that morning, with the consent of Captain Clifford Boynes, the
officers boarded the MONA QUEEN as part of its investigation of the
pollution incident involving the vessel.' During that investigation, the
officers discovered a large amount of oil on the deck of the engine
room as well as a fuel tank leak in the engine room;4 however, they
were unable to take any samples from the engine room at that time.5
As a result of these discoveries, the officers revoked the MONA
QUEEN'S certificate of inspection and ordered Captain Boynes to
bring the vessel to the Coast Guard Marine Safety Detachment Office
that afternoon for further inspection.6 That afternoon, Boynes arrived
without the MONA QUEEN, explaining that she was undergoing
repairs in Nanny Cay, a shipyard in the British Virgin Islands.7 The
officers instructed Boynes to cease all repairs and meet them at the
MONA QUEEN the next morning so that they could take a sample of
the substances in the engine room.' When the officers arrived at
Nanny Cay the next morning, neither Captain Boynes nor any another
agent for the MONA QUEEN was present.9 Although no one
consented to the search and no search warrant had been obtained, the
officers boarded the MONA QUEEN and proceeded to gather
evidence. '0
Subsequently, Boynes and Interisland, the shipowner, were
indicted in the United States District Court for the District of the
.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

See United States v. Boynes, 149 F3d 208, 210 (3d Cir. 1998).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Virgin Islands for knowingly discharging oil in violation of federal
law." Boynes and Interisland filed a motion to suppress the evidence
gathered by the Coast Guard officers' warrantless search of the
MONA QUEEN.12 Considering the search to be in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, the district court upheld the motion and ordered
the evidence suppressed. 13 The district court conceded that there may
have been probable cause to justify warrantless evidence gathering
during the first search of the engine room; however, this probable
cause dissipated when the officers terminated the search; therefore,
the second warrantless search was not proper.'4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the search was valid
and reversed the suppression order. 5 United States v. Boynes, 149
F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 1998).
The Fourth Amendment regulates governmental searches and
seizures performed on U.S. citizens. 6 It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the
7
persons or things to be seized.'
The Fourth Amendment was a reaction to the broad authority of the
British Crown to search the businesses and homes of American
Colonists for goods in violation of British tax law.' 8 It was designed
to protect the privacy of citizens against the compulsory production of
incriminating evidence."
As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment requires the
government to procure a warrant in order to perform a search." The
warrant requirement provides a more reliable safeguard against
improper searches than the hurried judgment of a law enforcement
11.
See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(c)(2)(A), 1321o(b)(3) (1994).
12. See Boynes, 149 F.3d at 210. This was a joint motion that also contained a request
that Boynes' statement at the Marine Safety Detachment Office be suppressed. See id. The
district court denied that part of the motion. See United States v. Varlack Ventures, Nos. 1996229, 1996-230, 1997 WL 530272, at * 11 (DV.I. Aug. 20, 1997).
13. See Varlack Ventures, Inc., 1997 WL at *10 (holding that there were no exigent
circumstances waiving the warrant requirement because the vessel had been stopped and taken
out of service).
14. Seeid. at*8.
15. See Boynes, 149 F.3d at 212.
16. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV
17. Id.
18. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 1 (1993).
19. See id.
20. See id. § 60.
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officer "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime."21 There is an exception to the warrant requirement when both
probable cause and exigent circumstances exist."
For example,
courts have recognized an "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement when there is probable cause to search; exigent
circumstances are inferred because the mobility of a vehicle makes
obtaining a warrant impracticable. 3 Another reason for the exception
is that the courts have found a diminished expectation of privacy in
regards to automobiles.2 4 The automobile exception has been held to
apply to vessels.2
Much of the jurisprudence concerning searches of vessels has
dealt with the authority of the Coast Guard and Customs to board
vessels to perform safety and documentation inspections.26 Courts
have held that 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) authorizes the Coast Guard to
perform routine documentation and safety checks aboard ships
without any suspicion of wrongdoing and without a warrant.27
In United States v. Williams,"8 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that Coast Guard officers must have
reasonable suspicion before they can search any "private" area of the
hold of a vessel on the high seas or international waters.29 Williams
dealt with the Coast Guard's search of a Panamanian vessel, the
21.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
22. See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searchesand Seizures § 69 (1993).
23. See 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 84 (1995); see also Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 439-43 (1973).
24. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1976), overruled on other groundsby
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1982).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481, 492 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Bain, 736 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir. 1984).
26. See 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) (1988). The statute provides in part:
The Coast Guard may make inquiries, examinations, inspections, searches,
seizures, and arrests upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has
jurisdiction, for the prevention, detection, and suppression of violations of laws of the
United States. For such purposes, commissioned, warrant, and petty officers may at
any time go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any
law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ship's
documents and papers, and examine, inspect, and search the vessel and use all
necessary force to compel compliance.
Id.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 130-31, 1980 AMC 2865, 2868-69
(Ist
Cir. 1980), cert. denied,449 U.S. 887 (1980); United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 533 (1st
Cir. 1985); United States v. Hillstrom, 533 F.2d 209, 210, 1976 AMC 1589, 1590 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied,429 U.S. 1038 (1977); United States v. Odom, 526 F.2d 339, 342, 1976 AMC 51, 54
(5th Cir. 1976).
28. 617 F.2d 1063, 1980 AMC 2550 (5th Cir. 1980).
29. See id. at 1087, 1980 AMC at 2579.
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PHGH, one hundred miles east of the Yucatan Peninsula. 3' After
surveying suspicious activity aboard the PHGH for several hours, the
Coast Guard received permission from the Panamanian government to
board and search the vessel.3' When the Coast Guard boarded the
PHGH, they attempted to locate her official registration number.32
Not locating the number in the engine room, an officer opened the
hatch to the cargo hold and discovered over twenty thousand pounds
of marijuana.33 The Williams court upheld the legitimacy of this
search, holding that a vessel's cargo hold was a non-private area,34 and
that the Coast Guard was authorized to look into any non-private area
of a foreign or American ship regardless of whether there was
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.35 Nevertheless, the court
stated that even assuming arguendo that the cargo hold was private,
the search was justified on the grounds that the Coast Guard had
reasonable suspicion that the PHGH was engaged in criminal
behavior.36
The Williams court also held that these kinds of searches on the
high seas should not require a search warrant because "the mobility
and anonymity of persons aboard vessels at sea require that the
government be able to exercise effective control when an opportunity
is presented."37 The court noted the administrative problems of
securing a warrant from an American court to search a vessel on the
high seas, far away from any courthouse or magistrate.3"
The
Williams court criticized the notion that the government should be
required to prove exigent circumstances for every warrantless search,
as such a requirement would weaken the Coast Guard's ability to
combat illicit activities such as drug smuggling. 39 The First Circuit
has followed the Williams approach, recognizing that the Coast Guard
can perform extended searches on the high seas without a warrant and
without the need to demonstrate exigent circumstances.40
30. See id.at 1070, 1980 AMC at 2552.
31.
See id., 1980 AMC at 2553.
32. See id. at 1070-71, 1980 AMC at 2553.
33. See id.at 1070, 1980 AMC at 2553.
34. See id.at 1084, 1086, 1980 AMC at 2575, 2577.
35. See id.at 1086, 1980 AMC at 2577-78.
36. Seeid. at 1085, 1980 AMC at 2575-76.
37. Id at 1087, 1980 AMC at 2579 (quoting James S. Carmichael, At Sea with the Fourth
Amendment, 32 U. MIAMI L. REv. 51 (1977)).
38. See id.at 1072-73, 1980 AMC at 2580.
39. See id.at 1087-88,1980 AMC at2580.
40. See United States v. Elkins, 774 F.2d 530, 533-34 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that
reasonable suspicion is needed for a search to extend beyond a standard section 89(a) document
and safety inspection); United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 133, 1980 AMC 2865, 2869-70 (1st
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The Eleventh Circuit has held that probable cause is needed in
order for Coast Guard officers to perform a "stem to stem" search.4
For example, in United States v. Lopez,42 Coast Guard officers sighted
a ship, the C & E, travelling toward the Florida coast.43 The officers
noted that the vessel was riding low in the water as if she were
carrying heavy cargo.' The officers subsequently boarded the vessel
to perform a document and safety search.45 In doing so, they noted
several suspicious things about the vessel and her crew.46 One of the
two crewmembers identified himself, but could not spell his surname
when asked.47 Both crewmembers stated that they were resident
aliens, but neither was able to produce a green card. 8 One officer
noted three feet of unaccounted space while conducting the initial
safety search of the vessel.49 When he tapped the space, there was a
"dead thud" as if it contained something." The C & E was taken to
the Islamorada Coast Guard base, where a search of the cargo hold
revealed several bales of marijuana." The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found that the suspicious
circumstances surrounding the ship and crew amounted to sufficient
probable cause to justify a warrentless search. 2 The court, although
requiring a higher standard than the Williams reasonable suspicion
5 3
standard, made no mention of the need for exigent circumstances.
In another Eleventh Circuit case, United States v. Roy,54 Coast
Guard officers detected the TRI-DIVE, a vessel suspected of carrying
contraband, forty-five miles off the coast of Jamaica.55 The officers
Cir. 1980) (holding that no reasonable suspicion is needed for a standard section 89(a) document
and safety search but once officers extend the search, probable cause is required).
41.
See, e.g., United States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1990 AMC 1518 (11th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Lopez, 761 F.2d 632 (11 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Boza, 741 F.2d 1382 (11 th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Andreu, 715 F.2d 1497 (11th Cir. 1983).
42. 761 F2d 632 (11th Cir. 1985).
43. See id. at 633-34.
44. See id.
at 634.
45.
See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 633.
52. See id. at 637. The court defined probable cause as "whether there were facts and
circumstances known to law enforcement officials which could have warranted their reasonable
belief that a crime had been or was being committed." Id. at 636.
53. See id. (stating that even though the search did not take place on the high seas,
probable cause was necessary to justify the warrantless search).
54.
869 F.2d 1427, 1990 AMC 1518 (1 th Cir. 1989).
55. See id.
at 1428, 1990 AMC at 1518.
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boarded the vessel and searched for two hours but no contraband was
found.5 6 However, the captain and crewmen gave suspiciously
conflicting statements as to how long they had been aboard the
vessel.57 The officers also noticed fresh caulking around the pontoon
spaces, but the captain admitted to having caulked only around the
windows.5" After departing the vessel, as the officers were debriefing,
they realized that they had overlooked a pontoon compartment. 59
They returned to the TRI-DIVE to inspect that compartment and
found it contained bales of marijuana.6' The Roy court held that the
second search was not a valid continuation of a section 89(a)
document and safety search (which carries no requirement of
suspicion
of wrongdoing), but was justified on grounds of probable
61
cause.
In United States v. Cardona-Sandoval,62 the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit followed the Eleventh Circuit in
requiring probable cause for a "stem to stem" search.63 In that case,
the Coast Guard encountered a suspicious-looking fishing vessel
allegedly travelling from Colombia to St. Maarten. 64 The Coast
Guard boarded and conducted a document and safety inspection but
discovered no contraband. 65
However, the vessel suspiciously
changed course after the Coast Guard officers left the vessel.66
During their debriefing, the officers decided that they had not
adequately searched the vessel, particularly the space around a newly
constructed shower. 67 The Coast Guard returned and searched this68
space for five hours with a crowbar, but found no contraband.
Nevertheless, the Coast Guard, on the grounds that the vessel had
suspiciously changed course and originated from a known drug
country (Colombia) and as a result of deteriorating sea conditions,
decided to take the vessel to the Roosevelt Roads Naval Base in
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 1431, 1990 AMC at 1518.
62. 6F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1993).
63. See id. at 24 (citing United States v. Lopez, 761 F2d 632, 636-37 (11th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Andreu, 715 F.2d 1497 (11 th Cir. 1983)).
64. See id. at 17-18. The Coast Guard asserted that its suspicions were raised due to the
messy state of the boat, a newly constructed shower, walls that appeared to be thicker than
normal, and a large water tank. See id. at 18.
65. See id. at 18.
66. See id. at 19.
67. See id.
68. See id.
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Puerto Rico to continue its search dockside.69 There, Navy divers and
a narcotics detection dog searched the vessel to no avail.7" The Coast
Guard then cut through the vessel's deck with a chainsaw and tore
down the ceiling and walls, but contraband was still not found.71 The
officers eventually found cocaine in two wooden beams that ran the
length of the vessel.72
The Cardona-Sandoval court recognized that there was a
diminished expectation of privacy aboard ships,73 and that the Coast
Guard generally has a broad license to conduct warrantless searches.74
Nevertheless, the court noted that Coast Guard searches must comport
with the Fourth Amendment. 75 The "relative intrusiveness of a search
must be justified by a corresponding level of suspicion supported by
specific facts gathered by investigating officials. ' 76 The court found
that the first boarding was a standard section 89(a) document and
safety search, requiring no suspicion of wrongdoing.77 Further, the
second boarding and drilling into the shower area was justified by the
The court found
Williams standard of reasonable suspicion.
however, that any "legally sustainable suspicion" dissolved with the
Navy divers and detection dog search in Puerto Rico.79 Thus, the
"destructive stem to stem search" carried out in Puerto Rico was not
founded upon probable cause and therefore improper.8 ° Accordingly,
the court ordered the suppression of the incriminating evidence."'
Hence, even though the Coast Guard has been granted a broad license
to conduct warrantless searches, Cardona-Sandovalpoints out that
this license is not limitless.
There is a third line of cases that seems to require both probable
cause and exigent circumstances in order for Coast Guard officers to

69. See id.
70. See id.
71.
See id.
72. See id. During this time, the vessel's crewmembers and captain had been detained in
a "large locked room [that] resembled a cage." Id. at 20.
73. See id.
at 21 (citing United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 53, 1983 AMC 1665, 1674
(1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Hilton, 619 F.2d 127, 131, 1980 AMC 2865, 2870 (1st Cir.
1980)).
74. See id. at 23.
75. See id.
76. Id.
77. See id. at 23-24 (discussing reasonable suspicion standard).
78. See id.at 24.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81.
See id.
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perform warrantless searches."2 One early example of this approach is
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's decision
United States v. Cadena."3 Cadena involved a sting operation on the
high seas where Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents
arranged an at-sea purchase of marijuana from Cadena, the master of
the LABRADOR. " When a Coast Guard vessel intercepted the
LABRADOR that evening, Cadena refused to heed all signals to
heave to." The vessel stopped and allowed officers to board only
after the Coast Guard fired its machine guns and cannon. 6 The
Cadena court ruled that the warrantless search was justified because
the Coast Guard had probable cause to believe there was contraband
on board the LABRADOR. 7 The Cadena court also noted that
exigent circumstances were manifest in the defendant's attempt to flee
from the Coast Guard. 8 The Cadena court, in dictum, noted that "[i]n
general, warrantless searches are unlawful even if made with probable
cause."8 9 The court went on to say that "exceptional circumstances"
will justify a warrantless search on the high seas. 90 That view,
however, does not represent the current approach in the Fifth
Circuit. 91 The Williams case specifically noted its disapproval with
the Cadena court's emphasis on the need for a warrant and the need
for the government to litigate the exigent circumstances issue. 92

82. See, e.g., United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F2d 632 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1979 AMC 1934 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Michelena-Orovio, 719 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d
1481 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bain, 736 F2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1974).
585 F.2d 1252, 1979 AMC 1934 (5th Cir. 1978).
83.
84. See id. at 1255-56, 1979 AMC at 1934.
See id. at 1256, 1979 AMC at 1936.
85.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 1263, 1979 AMC at 1947.
88. See id.
89. Id. at 1262, 1979 AMC at 1946. The Cadena court elected not to consider whether
warrantless section 89(a) searches of foreign vessels on the high seas were lawful. See id. at 1263
n.23, 1979 AMC 1947 n.23.
90. Id. at 1262, 1979 AMC at 1946.
91.
See United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1078 n. 18, 1980 AMC 2550, 2565 n. 18
(5th Cir. 1980) (disapproving of the Cadena language requiring warrants for maritime searches as
a general rule).
92. See id. at 1078, 1980 AMC at 2564-65. The Cadena court's specific holding that
probable cause and exigent circumstances will justify a search still stands. See, e.g., United
States v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481, 492-93 (5th Cir. 1978). The Weinrich court held similarly to
Cadena but contained no dicta requiring, as a general rule, probable cause and exigent
circumstances for maritime searches. See id. at 492-94. The Williams court disagreed with the
Cadena decision, but upheld the Weinrich decision. See Williams, 617 F2d at 1078, 1980 AMC
at 2564-65.
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In United States v. Bain,93 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that a warrantless search of a docked vessel
was justified by both probable cause and exigent circumstances.9 4 In
that case, U.S. Customs officers received a call from an informant
concerning suspicious activity aboard the defendant's boat, the
PRINCESS DEAN 11. 95 The Customs officers boarded the vessel and
requested to inspect the vessel's customs documents. 96 The officers
considered it suspicious that there were no customs papers aboard the
vessel. 97 One officer asked a crewman to bring the vessel's captain up
on deck.9 However, the captain did not appear for several minutes
and the officer became concerned that the crewman and captain were
destroying evidence or collecting weapons. 99 The officer went below
deck and witnessed a member of the crew placing a package into her
purse before coming up on deck."tu The officer on deck looked in her
purse and found methaqualone pills (quaaludes).' 1 In addition,
marijuana residue was found in the bathroom." 2 The Customs
officers then searched the vessel, finding additional incriminating
evidence of the defendant's narcotics smuggling operation. 3 The
Bain court held that the Customs officials were not required to have a
warrant or a suspicion of wrongdoing to board the ship and perform a
document inspection."N The court further held that the officers'
lawful observations aboard the ship created probable cause that
criminal activity was occurring on the vessel. °5 Furthermore, the
court found that exigent circumstances were present because the
officers had "reasonable fears" that the defendants were destroying
evidence or gathering weapons below the deck. 6 The Bain court also
recognized that the mobility of the vessel contributed to the exigent
93. United States v. Bain, 736 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11 th Cir. 1984).
94. See id. at 1488.
95. See id.at 1482.
96. See id.
at 1482-83.
97. See id. at 1483.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 1487-88 (citing United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 58081, 593 (1983)). Similar to the Coast Guard, the Customs Office has a federal statute that
authorizes searches of vessels for identification purposes. See 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a) (1994). The
illamonte-Marquez Court held that section 1581 (a) identification searches require no warrant or
suspicion of wrongdoing. See illamonte-Marquez,462 U.S. at 580-81.
105. See Bain, 736 F.2d at 1488.
106. See id.
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circumstances, even though the captain and crewmen had been
rounded up and the vessel was docked. 7
In United States v. Lingenfelter,08 the defendant contested the
DEA's warrantless search of a boat. The DEA had procured a warrant
to search the defendant's warehouse, where they uncovered a supply
of Thai marijuana.' °9 Soon thereafter, DEA agents noticed the
defendant aboard the drydocked ASMARA." ° The vessel matched a
drawing of a boat that the agents had found in the defendant's
The agents questioned employees of the boatyard who
briefcase.'
nervously stated that the defendant had ordered that the ASMARA be
placed into drydock and her waterline repainted. 1 2 This information
led the agents to believe that the defendant was attempting to conceal
that the ASMARA had arrived with a heavy load on board." 3
Additionally, the ASMARA was not registered with the Coast Guard
and did not contain any registration information on her bow." 4 The
agents boarded the vessel and found charts indicating that the
ASMARA had recently returned from Thailand." 5 A few days later,
defendant had given instructions to put the
the agents learned that the
6
boat back in the water."1
Wary that the defendant might flee, the DEA agents performed a
thorough search of the vessel, uncovering incriminating documents
and two kilograms of marijuana." 7 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the search because there was
probable cause to believe that the vessel had transported contraband"'
as well as exigent circumstances. "9 Among the factors that
contributed to a finding of probable cause were the repainting of the
ASMARA's waterline, the nervousness of the boatyard employees,
and the vessel's lack of a proper registration. 2 ° The court found
exigent circumstances pursuant to the automobile exception coupled
107. See id.
108. 997 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1993).
109. See id. at 635.
110.

See id.

111. Seeid.
112. See id.
113. Seeid.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Seeid.
118. See id. at 640 (analogizing to United States v. Johnson, 572 F.2d 227, 234 (9th Cir.
1978), to hold that absent a belief that a ship contains contraband, a search can be justified if there
is probable cause to believe it has transported contraband).
119. See id. at 640.
120. See id.
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with the information that the boat was to be placed back into the
water. 21
In the noted case, the main assertion of the government on
appeal was that the Fourth Amendment would not apply to a search of
a vessel in the British Virgin Islands, a foreign territory.'22 The
Boynes court took note of the thorny issue of searches in foreign
countries,' 23 but sidestepped it by assuming that the Fourth
Amendment would apply.'24 In applying the Fourth Amendment, the
court found that both probable cause and exigent circumstances were
present and justified the warrantless search. 5 The court defined
probable cause "in terms of facts and circumstances 'sufficient to
warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed
or was committing an offense."", 12 6 The court held that the officers
possessed probable cause because they witnessed the discharge of a
dark substance from the MONA QUEEN'S bilge outlet as well as the
large amount of oil in her engine room. 2 7 There is an issue of
whether it was necessary for the Boynes court to apply the higher
Fourth Amendment standard when there is a clear trend in the courts
to use the more lenient reasonable suspicion standard of section 89(a)
for searches of vessels. As to the exigent circumstances issue, the
Boynes court held that "[t]he seaworthiness of the MONA QUEEN
gave rise to the risk of flight," thus justifying a warrantless search of
the vessel. 28 Generally, it can be29 said that a court will uphold a
search unless it is truly outrageous.1
Courts that follow the Williams approach do not even mention
the need for exigent circumstances and only require reasonable
suspicion for a search of a vessel's private areas. The Lopez, Roy, and
Cardona-Sandovalcourts required probable cause for "stem to stern"
searches but did not mention exigent circumstances. With several
121. See id.
122. See United States v. Boynes, 149 F.3d 208, 209 (3d Cir. 1998).
123. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that the Bill of Rights applies to U.S.
citizens in foreign countries); see also United States v. Cadena, 585 F.2d 1252, 1262, 1979 AMC
1934, 1944 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to both U.S. and
foreign citizens once they become subject to criminal prosecution). But see United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270 (1990) (holding that Reid only extended the protections of
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to U.S. citizens in foreign countries, although two of the six
justices in the majority declined to join in with this reasoning completely).
124. See Boynes, 149 F.3d at 211.
125. See id. at 209.
126. Id. at 211 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975)).
127. Seeid. at211-12.
128. Id. at212.
129. See, e.g., United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 1993).
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courts ignoring the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement, there. is a question of whether the Boynes court even
needed to analyze the issue. The Boynes court was wise to employ
the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement because the cases that make no mention of
exigent circumstances can often be distinguished due to the fact that
they involved searches on the high seas. 3 Moreover, as the Williams
court noted, there are jurisdictional problems with requiring a warrant
for searches on the high seas.' 3 ' Furthermore, the Williams court was
concerned about hindering law enforcement on the high seas by
requiring the 32 government to litigate the issue of exigent
circumstances.
The line of cases that analyzed boat searches under a more rigid
construction of the Fourth Amendment dealt with searches of docked
boats. 33 Arguably, to justify a search of a docked boat, there should
have to be more than probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
Searches of docked boats do not carry the dangerous possibilities of
searches upon the high seas. Therefore, it was appropriate for the
Boynes court to analyze the search under classic Fourth Amendment
grounds.
There is still the issue of whether the Boynes court's analysis was
correct:
were probable cause and exigent circumstances truly
present? In this case, perhaps more so than the cases involving
narcotics smuggling, there is a very strong argument that the officers
had probable cause. The Coast Guard officers in this case had
probable cause because they witnessed and collected a polluting fluid
flowing from the defendant's boat. 34 On this issue, Boynes is most
like Cadena, where the defendant had unloaded marijuana onto an
undercover government vessel before the search. 35 Here, as in
Cadena, the officers had direct evidence of the defendant's
wrongdoing before the vessel was searched. In the other drug
smuggling cases, all the officers had to establish probable cause or
130. See United States v. Cardona-Sandoval, 6 F.3d 15, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1993); United
States v. Roy, 869 F.2d 1427, 1428, 1990 AMC 1518 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lopez,
761 F.2d 632, 633 (11 th Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1070, 1980 AMC
2550, 2552 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Elkins, 774 F2d 530, 532 (1st Cir. 1976).
131. See Williams, 617 F.2d at 1072-73, 1078 n. 18, 1087-90, 1980 AMC at 2555-56, 2565
n. 18, 2579-80 (discussing futility of requiring a warrant for searches on the high seas).
132. See id. at 1087-88, 1980 AMC at 2579-80 (disapproving of the rule requiring the
government to litigate the issue of exigent circumstances for searches on the high seas).
133. See United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F2d 632, 635 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Bain, 736 F.2d 1480, 1482 (1 th Cir. 1974).
134. SeeBoynes, 149 F.3dat210.
135. See Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1255-1256, 1979 AMC at 1936.
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reasonable suspicion were factors such as the appearance of the ship,
the behavior of those on board the ship, whether the ship was on the
DEA list of suspect ships, and other circumstantial factors. The
presence of direct evidence in the hands of the Coast Guard officers in
this case creates a compelling argument that a prudent man could
the defendants "had committed or [were] committing an
believe that
' 136
offense."

The Boynes court held that there were exigent circumstances
simply because the docked MONA QUEEN was seaworthy, creating
the risk of flight. 137 In the two Fifth Circuit cases that analyzed a
search under the Fourth Amendment, the search occurred on the high
In
seas, making exigent circumstances more plausible. 3 '
Lingenfelter, the court found exigent circumstances because the
officers had been told that the drydocked boat was about to be placed
back on the water, enabling a possible getaway. 39 However, in Bain,
the court found exigent circumstances for the search of a docked
vessel because the officers were fearful that the defendants, while
below deck, were destroying evidence or gathering weapons. 4 °
While the Boynes court was not incorrect in applying the
automobile/vessel exception to the warrant requirement, it could have
employed the facts of the case to make a stronger argument. For
instance, the court could have mentioned the fact that the officers
were afraid that the ship would be repaired and the evidence lost.
Another factor would have been that Captain Boynes did not
cooperate by meeting them at the boat. The court could have
considered this lack of cooperation to mean that the captain and the
ship's other agents could be trying to get rid of the evidence. Perhaps
the court should have been less cursory with this issue.
In sum, the Boynes decision was correct. The Boynes court
applied the higher Fourth Amendment standard, but its holding was
not overly broad. The court did not hold that the requirements of
probable cause and exigent circumstances would always be necessary
for searches upon vessels. By considering both probable cause and
exigent circumstances, the Boynes court employed a high standard in
analyzing its search, but left open the question of whether lower
standards could also be applied. The court prudently applied the
136. Boynes, 149 F.3d at 211.
137. Seeid.at212.
138. See, e.g., Cadena, 585 F.2d at 1256, 1979 AMC at 1936; United States v. Weinrich,
586 F.2d 481, 492 (5th Cir. 1979).
139. See United States v. Lingenfelter, 997 F.2d 632, 640-41 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. See United States v. Bain, 736 F.3d 1480, 1482 (11 th Cir. 1974).
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Fourth Amendment, sidestepping the tricky issues of whether the
Fourth Amendment applies to vessels in foreign countries or whether
section 89(a) justified the search. While the Boynes court did not
resolve any of these muddled questions concerning maritime searches,
it stayed on a straight doctrinal path in order to arrive at a sound
holding.
Lucy Jewel

